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This chapter provides exemplars of the influence of digital artifacts upon cultural 
experiences. We argue that the associations between people and artifacts, and specifically 
digital artifacts, is an increasingly dense, interwoven, and pivotal aspect of everyday cultural 
experience. Artifacts themselves resist any stability of meaning by being continuously 
disassembled and reassembled into newly meaningful assemblages. Digital artifacts extend 
this complexity by accelerating and extending cultural relationships both temporally and 
geographically, resulting in a wider range of potential and actual relationships in an 
expansive number of contexts. Through the connections that digital artifacts hold to people, 
there is a continuously fluid polysemous multivocality that incorporates the multiple and 
expansive parameters of power, meaning, and cultural knowledges. The human ability to alter 
and repurpose artifacts to suit immediate and shifting needs prevents any innate definitional 
quality from making a “table” a table or a “blog” a blog. Purpose and meaning of an artifact 
is continuously defined and then redefined between individuals and across time, beyond the 




Things have thus become regarded as texts, structured sign systems whose 
relationship with each other and the social world is to be decoded. In various post-
structural approaches to material forms, the metaphors of language, or discourse, 
and text have remained dominant in an understanding of things. The new emphasis 
here has been on polysemy, biographical, historical and cultural shifts in meaning, 
the active role or “agency” of things in constituting rather than reflecting social 
realities, power/knowledge relations and the poetics and politics of the process of 
interpretation itself, that we write things rather than somehow passively read off 
their meanings independently of our social and political location, values and 





Within the polysemy of human interaction, artifacts play a key role in the construction of 
shared and persistent meaning. The variability of use, form, and purpose of artifacts and the 
lack of precision that exists in their relationship to individuals ensure that any meanings are 
necessarily fluid. The associations between people and artifacts, and specifically digital 
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artifacts, is an increasingly dense, interwoven, and pivotal aspect of cultural experience. 
Artifacts have always made this contribution to cultural logics and knowledges. Digitial 
artifacts, however, accelerate and extend these relationships both temporally and 
geographically, resulting in a wider range of relationships in an expansive number of 
contexts. Through the connections that digital artifacts hold to people, there is of a 
continuously fluid polysemous multivocality that incorporates multiple power, meaning, and 
cultural knowledges. The human ability to alter and repurpose artifacts to suit immediate and 
shifting needs prevents any innate definitional quality from making a “table” a table or a 
“blog” a blog. Purpose and meaning of an artifact is continuously defined and then redefined 
between individuals and across time, beyond the reach of the original designers and 
manufacturers.  
As the use of information and communications technologies becomes ubiquitous in daily 
life, increased usage of technology alters how people initiate and engage in everyday social 
experiences. Premium examples of the influence of digital artifacts on cultural experience can 
readily be found with the advent of mobile social software, the uptake of YouTube as a 
mainstream media outlet, the importance of MySpace.com for (re)defining and extending 
social networks, and what is colloquially described as the “Internet of Things” as a gauge of 
contemporary technologies’ existing social acceptability. Artifacts also resist any stability of 
meaning by being continuously disassembled and reassembled into newly meaningful 
assemblages. Our world is constructed by the human ability to alter and repurpose the 
meaning and understanding of things. We exist in a social soup of polysemous cultural 
meanings that are framed by objects, feelings, memories, meanings, and understandings. The 
digital artifact as an artifact and, as a continuation of these theoretical understandings, 
continuously alters human-computer interaction (HCI) and design. Within these relationships 
of people to things, digital artifacts that are over-designed at their point of creation decrease 
the use value of the technology itself and reduce the capability for these artifacts to respond 
and interactively communicate with those who use them. 
 
 
2 The intellectual heritage of material culture 
 
The exploration of artifacts is primarily informed by the intellectual heritage of material 
culture studies. Contemporary work of authors such as Buchli (2002), Miller (1991), Shanks 
& Hodder (1997), and Tilley (1989)—who themselves utilize the writings of postmodernists, 
critical theorists and feminists, among others—question traditional understanding of objects 
as inherently meaningful and meaning-stable entities. A consequence of this work is an 
extensive body of literature that communicates with contemporary debates regarding HCI and 
design that offers a critical and politically nuanced framework for interpretation. 
The perceived lack of, and concern for the lack of, physical presence is a pivotal focus 
for the critical examination of digital artifacts in terms of their contribution to social and 
cultural experience. The close association of material culture studies with physical artifacts 
has also produced an intellectual reluctance to associate this body of work with digital 
culture. Oldenziel (1996, p. 65) questions the prerequisite of this focus by posing the 
question, “What is materiality in cyberspace?”, to which she answers with another question 
and the implied claim that “Is it not more or less what semioticians have proposed for some 
time that things are not existent and meaningless unless a meaning has been ascribed to them 
through essentially linguistic processes?”  
Material culture studies has a lengthy history that is primarily associated with collectors, 
archaeology, and the modernist project for knowing. Buchli (2002, p. 5) argues that the entire 
3 
super-category “material culture” was itself an intellectual invention that 
 
materializes something entirely new and uniquely Victorian and Western, as modern as 
the artifacts of industrialism on display at the Great Exposition of 1851 from which our 
more systematic nineteenth century collection of ethnographic material culture took 
their inspiration. 
 
However, despite this heritage and the reluctance of researchers, material culture studies 
is not artifact obsessed, artifact bound, or reduced to the tallying of physical remains. 
Material culture studies has matured into a discipline that has as its central imperative to 
interpret cultural practice. This broad remit draws upon a wide-ranging collection of authors 
from many disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. More critically nuanced studies 
have introduced a tightly integrated understanding of artifacts in relation to the cultures that 
produce, consume, interpret (and discard) them (Miller, 1991). The critical turn in material 
culture studies posits an understanding that the cultural consumption of an artifact is not 
necessarily bound to its production or its original design purpose. Tilley (2002, p. 27) makes 
this observation in relation to discussions of gender in a Melanesian context when it was 
observed that this “is a way of thinking about the relationship between producers and their 
products centering upon activity. It is this that produces meanings and serves to gender both 
persons and artifacts.” Action- or consumption-based perspectives allows material culture 
studies to break from the simplistic association of artifacts with archaeological provenance. 
Material culture is capable of examining any artifact in the broadest sense. Increased 
distancing from traditional archaeological contexts also enables the examination of artifacts 
to move beyond looking at only functional and tool-based items. Ultimately the flexibility 
provided by existing critical interpretation disconnects the assumption that physical presence 
is the central quality defining an artifact.  
 
 
3 Digital artifacts and everyday life: Within or without? 
 
With increased recognition for the ever-presence of the digital artifact, there is a significant 
and close relationship to mainstream culture. In this context, how a digital artifact is created, 
and by implication how it is designed, becomes an important aspect of the everyday and 
influences wider and wider ranges of individuals. Digital has become increasingly 
synonymous with those social experiences enabled through the mediations of information 
technology (Thrift, 1996, p. 1464). Popular emphasis upon the technology that enables 
navigation and access to the hegemonic and celebratory “computer world,” however, belies 
its thoroughly social foundations (Sheridan & Zeltzer, 1997, p. 86). Technology-oriented 
presentations of the digital world, in the contemporary guise of cyberspace, the Internet, or 
the World Wide Web, have cast it as a panacea for the problems and experiences of reality 
(Graham, 1997, p. 41; cf. Stoll, 1995, pp. 10–11). IBM and Microsoft promote their tools as 
the key to globe-spanning successful commerce. In a similar vein some educational 
technologists predict the demise of the formal lecture theatre (cf. Stoll, 1995, p. 146). 
Although these claims solidify the digital world as a definable aspect of cultural practice and 
as a space for social experience, they do little to clarify any assumed or perceived distinction 
between “digital” and “human” life. At an immediate and sensory level the digital world is 
present in a somehow disembodied contrast to the “reality” of physical presence; however, 
precursors of this form of cultural experience can be located with radio listening and 
television viewing (Green, 1997, p. 59) and even the success of the UK’s Open University. 
Disembodiment is the distinctive quality of social experience conducted within a digital 
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provenance. However, and of greater significance for the design and creation of digital 
artifacts, computer-mediated experience reflects and imitates the practices of real life 
(Whittle 1997, p. 12). 
Regarding the Internet as an environment containing artifacts necessitates a critical and 
interpretative position regarding the artifact itself, both in cyberspace and in real life. 
Irrespective of any perceptions of immateriality, the Internet emphasizes artifacts, including 
those with a digital provenance, as culturally significant (Shanks & Hodder, 1997, p. 8). 
Artifactual research worldviews are distinct from “everything-as-text”-oriented 
interpretations. Gottdiener (1995, p. 22) claims 
the issue is not the relationship between the everyday meanings and social practice, 
but of articulating a philosophy of consciousness independent of social context. Such a 
position, although challenging to philosophy and the sciences that depend on textual 
interpretation, has limited value in the analysis of material culture.  
 
If the digital is briefly considered beyond the scope of solely technological definitions, it 
is most consistently described as a social space without physicality. Thrift (1996, p. 1465) 
cites a range of conceptualizations of the digital that are all founded upon spatially orientated 
definitions. Lefebvre’s The Production of Space (1991) is the starting point for many of these 
definitions. Lefebvre (1991, pp. 38–39) argues that social space cannot be directly equated 
with physical space. He also cautions against the “fetishisation” of this space in itself (1991, 
p. 90). “Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, 
while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others.... Social space implies a great diversity of 
knowledge” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 73). The warning against fetishisation is particularly relevant 
as it endangers analysis, focusing upon a weak conceptual “wrapper” rather than the 
relationships of people to things. Wise (1997) reasserts the significance of Lefebvre’s triadic 
conceptualization of space and the privilege of “representational space” within other 
discussions of social space. Nuanced understandings of social space, Wise (1997, p. 78) 
claims, prevent the technological contributions to the formation of spatial practice from being 
disentangled, in any meaningful way, from the symbolic representations of that space. These 
interrelated mediatory influences prevent discussion of the digital from descending into 
technological determinist arguments. 
Defining the digital world within a critical framework does not discard the technology 
that mediates these cultural practices, but neither should these approaches be driven by the 
mere presence of this, or any other, specifically named technology. Technology is intertwined 
with other cultural phenomena and contributes to the particularity of the provenance in which 
cultural practices are found and shaped. The emphasis that has been placed upon computing 
technology should be assessed as a subjective claim that supports particular interest groups 
and, it could be claimed, particular interested corporations (Bereano, 1997, p. 27). Seeking 
and finding some form of distinct reality within the digital world attenuates the differences 
between the space being observed from the space in which the researcher is observing. 
However, placing primacy on the immediacy of experience in a single space—the 
fetishisation of space—potentially ignores the ways in which experience and understanding 
of cultural practices is always multilocational. Everyday life is simultaneously located in 
many spaces without specific qualification, and it would be a similar methodological 
nonsense to disentangle the experience(s) of space(s) inside a car parked in a shopping mall 
in a large city as it is to speak solely of a virtual space as an isolated cultural construction. 
A variety of already possible Internet activities show that the experience of the everyday 
continually reaffirms the reality of the digital environment. These experiences include the 
significant stages of life such as marriage ceremonies, birth and funereal ceremonies, as well 
as malicious activities, such as stalking and rape (Silver, 2000, p. 22) and various forms of 
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consumption, including on-line shopping, gambling, and teaching and learning, as well as 
more mundane written and spoken communication. Experiences that cross between digital 
and physical space, by relating sites of cultural engagement to one another, further stress that 
multiple provenances of experience combine to reconfirm the intertwined reality of each 
space. An example of these intersections between digital experience and physical 
consequence is the early case of the cyberstalking of Jayne Hitchcock, now the president of 
Working to Halt Online Abuse (WHOA). During a 2-year period, the stalker spammed, sent 
e-mail floods, sent unwanted mail order goods, and had the FBI investigate her. Cynthia 
Armistead, in example of another of cyberstalking, experienced physical stalking, e-mail 
abuse, and the use of her name and email address for sex services. The significance of these 
incidents is the manner in which the specific qualities of multiple provenances of cultural 
practice (Geertz, 1973/1993, p. 22; Marcus, 1995) have been used to maximize the social 
impact on the victim. The experiences of Hitchcock and Armistead are increasingly mundane, 
normalized, and routine aspects of everyday life that are regularly reported, ever more briefly, 
in the media. 
Technology and the design of artifacts are ever-present in the discussion of the digital 
artifact as part of the shifting transitional interface between physical and digital spaces. 
Information technology, through its constant presence and its observational absence, assists 
in affirming the reality and purpose of the digital. However, experience of the digital does not 
directly equate with the experience of any specific technology, software, or hardware, 
although this does impart distinct qualities onto that particular representation of space 
(Lefebvre 1991, p. 38). 
Analysis of digital artifacts tends to bind analysis to a specific provenance. The 
abundance of articles that discuss Web pages and Web sites as the meaningful level of study 
indicates the appeal for this form of analysis (e.g., Cronin, 1998; Rich, 1998; Sclafane, 1998; 
Smith 1998). Investigation of specific Web pages endangers the disentangling a digital object 
from its wider assemblage of cultural and social relations, including other Web pages, for 
which it is presumed to be a singularly meaningful and interpretable thing. In effect, the 
analysis of a particular artifact as an isolated object tends towards the effacement of its 
relationship to the experiences of everyday life and contextualizes it solely as an artifact of 
technology (Wakeford, 2000, p. 35). One example of over-design and the obliteration of 
everyday life from examination of the Web is the insistence on top-down considerations for 
Web sites that ignore search engines, bookmarks, or even human memory. The object of this 
seemingly neutral technology is then privileged with the “voice” and powerful hegemonic 
weight of information technology and the biased status of data. As a consequence the cultural 
meanings that remain to be interpreted from this object are primarily mediated through the 
wider metameanings attached to the general technology itself rather than the contextualized 
and specific mediation of everyday use and experience. While examination of individual 
objects, such as Web pages, is an important avenue for analysis, it cannot become the focus 
of all analysis, as the tendency will be towards the over-design of artifacts or actions with a 
digital provenance. Such an approach, applied more widely, would necessitate, for example, 
every discussion of the telephone to be prefaced with a discussion of telephony, and media 
studies would be required to speculate on the qualities, nature and meaning of the cathode ray 
tube and radio frequency propagation. 
 
 
4 Cultural Artifact—Digital Provenance 
 
The artifact is a culturally meaning-laden “thing.” However, discussion of the artifact 
inevitably conflates it with its physical qualities as an apparently coherent, necessary, and 
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synonymous relationship (Miller, 1991, p. 31). A physical thing that is “meaningful” is 
always an artifact (cf. Shanks & Hodder, 1997, p. 17). However, discussions that commence 
with the interpretation of artifactual meanings and design are not bound to any specific 
material form.  
The reference of a digital object to a physical analogy is unnecessary when the Internet 
has become such a dominant and mainstream site of cultural activity in postindustrial 
societies (Touraine, 1974, p. 116). Gadamer (1989, pp. 242–254), however, suggests that 
without a fusion of horizons there can be no communication between parties, in this case 
among a variety of provenances. For the user undertaking an everyday interpretation of 
artifacts that is fully immersed in the spaces of the Internet, the awareness and sense of the 
artifact, and a desire for them, is integral to the current location and environment. The 
intellectual contradictions between physical and digital artifacts are a political conflict in the 
broadest sense. 
While meaning is generally perceived to shift around the anchorage of an artifact’s 
physical qualities, its various qualities, including its design, provide different forms of 
meaning-stabilizing anchorages (Miller, 1991, p. 116; Miller & Slater, 2000). However, none 
of these anchorage points are individually stable entities; they are all, along with the artifact 
itself, the product of shifting social and cultural forces (cf. Miller, 1991, pp. 126–127). The 
anchorage of style, in all its indefiniteness, is an important quality for many forms of artifacts 
(Lemonnier 1993, p. 11). For example, the continually changing form of domestic motor 
vehicles is tied to a range of qualities including prestige, style, economic imperatives, and, 
consequently, petrol consumption, and engine size. 
The tendency to intellectually anchor the artifact to physical qualities emphasizes its 
original design as the point where particular sets of meanings were made stable (Miller, 1991, 
p. 3). However, some qualities of the artifact must precede its creation and many others are 
recrafted after its creation. The tools that aid creation of an artifact also reveal the close 
interrelationship of artifacts with one another. The very specific utility of woodworking tools, 
such as planes, shapers, and chisels, is one example of how particular artifacts are not 
designed in isolation without some understanding of future provenance, desire, or need for 
the artifacts that they will create. In these tools, qualities such as utility and the raw materials 
become aspects of the design of the artifact that is created. While there is a need for pre-
existing artifacts to craft the indefinite but necessary environment for new artifacts to come 
into existence, after design and manufacture of an artifact, the relationship of specific 
qualities to an intended meaning may hold only fleeting association that does not persist 
through space, time, or across cultures. The further the object is separated from its time and 
place of original design, the wider the range of potential meanings that will become ascribed 
to it. Distance, acquired through temporal or spatial separation, is the most effective means of 
increasing the polysemous qualities of the artifact (Shanks & Hodder, 1997, p. 9).  
The increased fluidity of cultural meanings that crafts an artifact’s qualities is a hallmark 
of postindustrial culture (Smart, 1992, pp. 52 & 143; Touraine, 1974). This fluidity is 
reflected in the relationship of the ideational and physical within contemporary culture as a 
politically negotiated position. Baudrillard (1981/1994, p. 19) takes this negotiation to an 
extreme with his claim that, “the impossibility of rediscovering an absolute level of the real is 
of the same order as the impossibility of staging illusion. Illusion is no longer possible, 
because the real is no longer possible.”  
Baudrillard’s theorization of the “real” and illusion enable their negotiation to be 
considered in the postdesign context, and by implication the digital, effectively rendering the 
physical a nonessential quality of the artifact. Another example, which also suggests that 
artifacts are not the consequence of any fixed or measured amount of design, comes from 
archaeology. The materials extracted from archaeological digs again become artifactual 
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through the ascriptions offered of them by archaeologists seen through significant cultural 
and temporal distance (Hodder, 1989, p. 67). The interpreted artifacts of archaeology possess 
a complex provenance. The already debatable nature of meaning possessed by artifacts is 
further problematized by archaeology; the “real” meanings ascribed to the artifact at its 
creation are distanced from the “imagined” meanings ascribed by archaeologists (Lemonnier, 
1993).  
Artifacts evoke particular understandings of the culture(s) that they exist within. An 
artifact can only be designed or understood by being considered in situ and in relation to the 
other artifacts of that space (Miller, 1991, pp. 109–11; Shanks & Hodder, 1997, p. 11). And 
even in this context, Aunger (2006, p. 724) observes, “not all social messages are equally 
attended to or adopted by their receivers.” The contextual environment constructs an 
expectation for the artifact and, in turn, the artifact crafts an expectation for the space. This 
reciprocation connects artifacts and meanings, creating a normality. The expectation and even 
desire for normality provides a key anchorage around the meaning of an artifact in this 
association with a particular meaning or set of meanings.  
Everyday artifacts are positioned within existing power structures. The paucity in the 
range of interpretations that are available is a consequence of their persistence within the 
mundane. Their interpretation is similarly a consequence of the particular power relations that 
act upon the artifact. Our claim is that the limited range of interpretations applicable to a fork 
is closely related to the extent that the fork is bound, through its mundaneness, within a dense 
system of social and artifactual relationships. With the example of the fork, it is bound to 
other apparently mundane items with an intensity that almost prohibits conceptualizing 
(within contemporary Western culture) without an understanding of a knife. This stable 
microsystem frames and supports wider parameters of power including, for example, the 
understanding of dinnertime etiquette. The conflation of physical qualities of the fork with 
the concept of the artifact called “fork” restricts which artifacts can possess “forkness.” The 
artifact is restricted by these boundaries of meaning but in continually different ways. These 
limitations are not inherent in the artifact itself but develop through the mediation of 
contemporary social and cultural relations and the manner by which artifacts are perceived. 
Tilley (1989, p. 191) says, “an object, any object, has no ultimate or unitary meaning that can 
be held to exhaust it.”  
The example of the fork reinforces the deceptiveness of designing and understanding an 
artifact primarily through its physical qualities. The fork’s functional simplicity, as a fork, is 
a designed simplicity crafted over a lengthy period that reveals the currently received 
physical forms of the artifact. None of this heritage can be understood, seen, or needs to be 
seen through direct, uncritical, or untheorized observation. In this way, the fork represents a 
near-ultimate form in terms of its interface and design. 
Defining the artifact as a product of culture that agglomerates various qualities provides 
the opportunity for understanding future design in HCI. The cautionary aspect of these claims 
is that the digital artifact is very much a product of its time. Without the influence of debates 
about cyberspace, the virtual, and the Web, the suggestion that the immaterial and digital can 
equally be considered artifactual would be seen as esoteric, eccentric, or verging on the 
theological.  
Materiality is one of the qualities particularly ascribed to the artifact, and is sometimes 
insisted upon as the most significant quality of an artifact (Buchli, 1995, p. 189; Miller, 1991, 
p. 3). The conflating of the artifact to a particular set of physical qualities can be questioned 
in the light of a usable and accessible cyberspace that extends beyond the capabilities of 
unmediated, immediate, and personal exchange. The digital artifact also breaks down the 
apparent logic for the binarism and separation of symbolism and materiality (Buchli, 1995, p. 
186). Seeing the artifact as an artifact allows the textual position to be discarded for an 
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understanding in which the artifact is placed in a direct relationship to human agency 
(Thomas, 1997, p. 211). This position, with an insistence upon the need for a confirmed and 
personally affirmed physical reality, leads, potentially, to the argument that, for example, an 
artifact must be visible (Criado, 1997, p. 198), or touched, to be interpreted. This complexity 
ensures that there is never, and can never be, a raw articulation or clean sense of meaning 
(Riceour, 1981), but rather a conceptual and experiential polysemous soup filled with related 
tendencies, possibilities, and oppositions.  
Archaeologists infer the presence of absent artifacts from surrounding objects and spatial 
relationships. The conventional archaeological record, too, only returns a selection of objects 
through the combined consequences of time and provenance and as a reflection of the 
relationships of social power in that and subsequent periods of time (Pearson, 1997). Digital 
artifacts provide denser strata but can only be partially representative of the prevailing social 
and cultural relations found on-line. The online journal Slate summarizes the representational 
nature of the Internet by claiming that “to archive the Internet with absolute fidelity would 
require cloning not only every computer on the Internet, but also every person using every 
computer” (Barnes, 1997, p. 2). Baudrillard’s (1981/1994, pp. 1–2) more general 
observations regarding simulation extends this point: 
The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the 
map that precedes the territory...today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across 
the extent of the map.... But it is no longer a question of either maps or territories. 
Something has disappeared, the sovereign difference, between one and the other, that 
constituted the charm of abstraction. 
 
 
5 Designing artifacts 
 
Attempting to identify and design an artifact on an interpretative  plane within the shifting 
versions of reality and in relation to the contemporary culture is a fraught task. We utilize the 
term artifact in the conventionally received sense as “the product of human action” 
(Richardson, 1974, pp. 4–5). However, what requires re-examination in light of the 
significance of HCI and the Web are the acts and actions that are understood to produce the 
artifact. More widely, it is the interrelationship of artifacts and humans within particular 
environmental contexts that contribute to each other’s definition. It is in the constant 
reconfiguration and shifting interrelationships between people and artifacts—what is 
described elsewhere as culture—that produces an understanding of the artifact and an 
understanding of ourselves. The indefinite, problematic, and variously defined culture 
assumes a particular reality when it is perceived through artifacts (Soja, 1989, p. 79). Seeking 
the product of human action on the Web necessitates understanding the artifact as the result 
of particular intersecting cultural relationships. An artifact is an artifact because humans 
define it (Hides. 1997, p. 11).  
Artifacts move with varying relationships of intensity to the constantly dynamic cycles 
of social and cultural interpretation and misinterpretation. “Artifactuality,” as the collection 
of an artifact’s qualities, operates as a single unified signifier for an arrangement of social 
relationships (Miller, 1991, p. 13). Most significantly, archaeology deals initially with the 
qualities of the artifact in order to proceed to an interpretation of the social and cultural 
conditions in which the artifact was originally ascribed meanings (Buchli, 1995, p. 189; 
Tilley, 1989, p. 191).  
Artifacts are products of human manufacture that have persistence beyond and outside 
individual subjectivity and are not bound to a specific subject’s immediate experience 
(Richardson, 1974, p. 4). Artifacts have fixed qualities that allow at least minimal 
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interpretation over extended periods of time, irrespective of spatial separation or their 
alienation from their designer. Miller (1991, pp. 61–62), by drawing upon the intellectual 
tradition of Munn, identifies the persistence of meaning over significant spatial difference 
with the canoes of the Kula. What is being portrayed here is a concern with the creation of an 
object in which social relations are implicated, but which will ultimately be delivered up for 
the use of other people, by being launched into the Kula Ring. This is an example of the 
problem of alienation: Certain conditions serve to separate the creators from the object of 
their creative processes. 
It is worth considering the extreme positions in these discussions of the artifact. For the 
realist, the artifact is “there” telling “us” about the cultural life paths of “others” (Hides, 
1997, p. 13). A constructivist position, in contrast, suggests that the artifact tells “us” about 
“ourselves” through our interpretation of the artifact; it is an act of autobiography revealed by 
our imparting of particular meanings onto its presence (Baudrillard, 1970/1996, p. 105; 
Buchli, 1995). The distinction between the interpretations of the anthropologist from the 
generally more casual observations of the nonanthropologist can be contrasted in a similar 
manner. To extrapolate cultural life paths from an artifact requires a range of knowledges that 
cannot be automatically inferred from the examination of an artifact’s observable qualities. 
To achieve this form of interpretation requires the privilege, legitimacy and, probably, 
training of an anthropologist and the theoretical perspective of the “realist.” In contrast, 
interpreting the artifact as an act of autobiography, in relation to one’s own subjectivity, 
imitates more anticipated everyday processes of interpretation, ascription, and meaning 
making in relation to an artifact. The artifact can be considered by its various qualities, such 
as utility and aesthetic appeal, the social status it imparts, its value or comparative rarity in 
relation to the social experiences, and motivations of those who engage with it (Buchli, 1995, 
p. 190).  
 
 
6 Spimes and the Internet of Things: An artifactual conundrum? 
 
“Spimes” and the Internet of Things are labels for what is currently a primarily conceptual 
understanding of the evolution of the Internet and of objects more broadly. However, they are 
significant for this discussion as the consolidation of a series of technological developments 
and technologist understandings of the contemporary and future artifact-filled world. These 
things also represent the “next step” in the increasingly blurred distinction between physical 
and digital artifacts to the point that the need or purpose of the division is effectively effaced. 
Spimes are conceptual objects introduced by Bruce Sterling at SIGGRAPH 2004 and 
through his book, Shaping Things (2005). Spimes are most simply defined as “noisy objects.” 
(Sterling, 2005, p. 11). More specifically a spime is a physical object that is uniquely 
identifiable and is aware of its location and current environment. Spimes are conventional 
everyday objects that are enhanced with the capacity to systematically receive and send data. 
The spime-object collects and throws out to its surrounding environment vast amounts of data 
that could be collected and utilized. What is generally implied rather than explicitly defined 
in Sterling’s definition is that the noise of a spime is collected and transmitted in a digital 
rather than analog format. Sterling can imply this format, as it is clearly the intention in his 
discussion. This implied assumption leads to the somewhat erroneous belief that the concept 
of the noisy object is a new and as-yet conceptual thing when it is merely the digital spime 
that is yet to become available. However, as we have already outlined, the distinction of 
physical and digital has increasingly become a meaningless and flaccid distinction. 
We are already surrounded by albeit less smart and analog spimes in the form of existing 
physical objects: the fork, the knife, and other mundane objects. The imprecision of the 
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relationship between humans and artifacts is a consequence of the continuously fluid and 
analog format with which we interact. As straightforward examples of this phenomenon, the 
multiple meanings conveyed through the printed word provides us with only partial 
understanding when we read the words on a cereal packet while, similarly, the patina of age 
on an antique can only partially reflect the environments that it has passed through. Noisy 
analog data, in the form of conveyed meanings, associations, and context from these old 
spimes is ever-present but never wholly or permanently captured. More formal analysis and 
interpretation of the variety of meanings transmitted by analog spimes has been the preserve, 
as we have already indicated, of material culture studies. The day-to-day interpretation of 
these same objects is what we do everyday. The digital spime does not alter the already 
theorized or everyday human relationships with artifacts, although it is possible for suitably 
specified technology to capture quantitative data from the spime. This transfer of data defers 
the human relationship with the original spime to become mediated through yet another 
artifact: digital, physical, or physical with digital capabilities (i.e., another spime). The 
human–artifact relationship remains firmly positioned as an interpreted mediated negotiation 
of polysemy through previous human experience and knowledge and the locational, 
environmental, and relational context of the artifact itself.  
 
 
7 The polysemous soup of digital artifacts: Design or anti-design? 
 
The Internet of Things provides the technical capacity to make the linkage between physical 
artifacts (generally well-theorized things) and specific digital artifacts (poorly-theorized 
things). A reflection of the determinism that surrounds the technological bias for this 
development is the degree with which the Internet of Things has been conducted with little 
social critique and, instead, has been expressed as a series of capabilities or actions that exist 
largely in potentia. Irrespective of their provenance, things are defined and made meaningful 
by people. Consequently designing and defining future artifacts is an act shaped by previous 
cultural experience, knowledge, and experience with other things. Pivotal to this debate and 
the relationship of people with artifacts is Sterling’s (2005, p. 11) introduction of the concept 
of the spime, an object that is entirely trackable during its entire lifetime, which is a concept 
completely alien to material culture theory and a concept of the object that is readily 
critiqued. 
As elements of the digital impact upon different aspects of everyday life and cultural 
activity, it becomes increasingly less useful to focus on understanding, and therefore to 
design around presumed differences between digital and physical realities. Instead, a more 
specific mode of analysis is required that reconnects spaces of connected cultural activity. 
Culturally aware approaches de-emphasize technologically determined discussions of 
contemporary digital spaces in toto and advocate a relative approach in which research is 
conducted with observation in the digital rather than of the digital. 
The immediate problem for conducting critical digital research is to deliver a position 
that acknowledges a digital provenance of experience without automatically affirming the 
simplistic observation that everything digital is not real or physical. The social sciences have 
expended considerable effort tackling ontological issues regarding reality through works that 
have entered the sociological canon, such as those of Berger and Luckmann (1966), Arbib 
and Hesse (1986), and Foucault (1973/1983). These analyses suggest that the assignment of 
quantities of “reality” to social phenomena is illusory; similarly, the digital world cannot be 
dismissed or disregarded solely because it lacks corporeality. “Space is social morphology: it 
is to lived experience what form itself is to the living organism, and just as intimately bound 
up with function and structure” (Lefebvre. 1991, p. 94). The boundaries to experience in the 
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digital world are the consequence of the complexities of a specific provenance and not 
because the digital world somehow lacks reality: The virtual is equally capable of producing 





Successful artifacts are notorious for resisting the application of design. The “best” artifacts 
are those that have evolved, been extensively used, and (re)adapted. The example of the fork 
(or open source software) is pertinent. Rapid and participatory development and change is 
preferable to individual design. The individual social understanding offered by a single 
designer cannot be compared to the collective weight of social understanding that many users 
provide and increasingly willingly offer. Identifying the key features of an artifact and 
designing solely for those features present the danger of designing for desire rather than for 
greater social need or purpose. This approach takes the route of the “best” inventors—
Edison’s commercial knowledge prevailed over Tesla’s ability as an inventor. The result of 
this example is a Western world left with a commercially successful but inefficient series of 
artifacts that were willingly adopted and accepted on criteria other than design alone.   
The polysemy of human experience and human relationship to artifacts ensures that there 
is no ultimate or obvious adoption of the best artifacts, whatever that may mean. Designers 
can adopt and absorb this understanding by becoming part of a participatory process that 
incorporates feedback loops directly into the design process. The digital artifact is not 
burdened by the conventional process of manufacture and the ultimate commitment that 
conventional production implies. Digital artifacts can be created, tried, tested, and discarded 
within a timeframe measured in hours rather than months. However, this flexibility and 
rapidity must parallel concurrent understanding that some design (and some things) must 
simply be discarded, as rapidly and as willingly as they can be created. 
This is not a position that advocates anarchy or a complete disregard for design. We are 
making the argument for design processes that develop artifacts within the social and cultural 
environment where they will be utilized. In other words, designers of digital artifacts need to 
exploit the participatory, generally adept, and critical environment that Internet and Web 
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